We, the Heads of African States and Governments assembled in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,

Convinced that it is the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny,

Conscious of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples,

Conscious of our responsibility to harness the natural and human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples in all spheres of human endeavor,

Inspired by a common determination to promote understanding among our peoples and cooperation among our states in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brother-hood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences,

Convinced that, in order to translate this determination into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained,

Determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms,

Dedicated to the general progress of Africa,

Persuaded that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, to the Principles of which we reaffirm our adherence, provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive cooperation among States,

Desirous that all African States should henceforth unite so that the welfare and well-being of their peoples can be assured,

Resolved to reinforce the links between our states by establishing and strengthening common institutions,

Have agreed to the present Charter.

Establishment

Article I

1. The High Contracting Parties do by the present Charter establish an Organization to be known as the ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.
2. The Organization shall include the Continental African States, Madagascar and other Islands surrounding Africa.

Purposes

Article II

1. The Organization shall have the following purposes:

1. To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States;
2. To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa;
3. To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence;
4. To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and
5. To promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

2. To these ends, the Member States shall coordinate and harmonize their general policies, especially in the following fields:

1. Political and diplomatic cooperation;
2. Economic cooperation, including transport and communications;
3. Educational and cultural cooperation;
4. Health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation;
5. Scientific and technical cooperation; and
6. Cooperation for defense and security.

Principles

Article III

The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:

1. The sovereign equality of all Member States.
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States.
3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.
4. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.
5. Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighboring States or any other States.
6. Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent.
7. Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

Membership

Article IV

Each independent sovereign African State shall be entitled to become a Member of the Organization.

Rights and Duties of Member States

Article V

All Member States shall enjoy equal rights and have equal duties.

Article VI

The Member States pledge themselves to observe scrupulously the principles enumerated in Article III of the present Charter.

Institutions

Article VII

The Organization shall accomplish its purposes through the following principal institutions:

1. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
   
2. The Council of Ministers.
3. The General Secretariat.
4. The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government

Article VIII

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall be the supreme organ of the Organization. It shall, subject to the provisions of this Charter, discuss matters of common concern to Africa with a view to coordinating and harmonizing the general policy of the Organization. It may in addition review the structure, functions and acts of all the organs and any specialized agencies which may be created in accordance with the present Charter.

Article IX

The Assembly shall be composed of the Heads of State and Government or their duly accredited representatives and it shall meet at least once a year. At the request of any Member State and on approval by a two-thirds majority of the Member States, the Assembly shall meet in extraordinary session.

Article X

1. Each Member State shall have one vote.
2. All resolutions shall be determined by a two-thirds majority of the Members of the Organization.
3. Questions of procedure shall require a simple majority. Whether or not a question is one of procedure shall be determined by a simple majority of all Member States of the Organization.
4. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Organization shall form a quorum at any meeting of the Assembly.

Article XI

The Assembly shall have the power to determine its own rules of procedure.

The Council of Ministers

Article XII

1. The Council of Ministers shall consist of Foreign Ministers or other Ministers as are designated by the Governments of Member States.
2. The Council of Ministers shall meet at least twice a year. When requested by any Member State and approved by two-thirds of all Member States, it shall meet in extraordinary session.

Article XIII

1. The Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. It shall be entrusted with the responsibility of preparing conferences of the Assembly.
2. It shall take cognizance of any matter referred to it by the Assembly. It shall be entrusted with the implementation of the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. It shall coordinate inter-African cooperation in accordance with the instructions of the Assembly conformity with Article II (2) of the present Charter.

Article XIV

1. Each Member State shall have one vote.
2. All resolutions shall be determined by a simple majority of the members of the Council of Ministers.
3. Two-thirds of the total membership of the Council of Ministers shall form a quorum for any meeting of the Council.

Article XV

The Council shall have the power to determine its own rules of procedure.

General Secretariat

Article XVI

There shall be a Secretary-General of the Organization, who shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Secretary-General shall direct the affairs of the Secretariat.

Article XVII

There shall be one or more Assistant Secretaries-General of the Organization, who shall be appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

Article XVIII

The functions and conditions of service of the Secretary-General, of the Assistant Secretaries-General and other employees of the Secretariat shall be governed by the provisions of this Charter and the regulations approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.
2. Each member of the Organization undertakes to respect the exclusive character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration

Article XIX

Member States pledge to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means and, to this end decide to establish a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, the composition of which and conditions of service shall be defined by a separate Protocol to be approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Said Protocol shall be regarded as forming an integral part of the present Charter.

Specialized Commission

Article XX

The Assembly shall establish such Specialized Commissions as it may deem necessary, including the following:

1. Economic and Social Commission.
2. Educational, Scientific, Cultural and Health Commission.
3. Defense Commission.

Article XXI

Each Specialized Commission referred to in Article XX shall be composed of the Ministers concerned or other Ministers or Plenipotentiaries designated by the Governments of the Member States.

Article XXII

The functions of the Specialized Commissions shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the present Charter and of the regulations approved by the Council of Ministers.

The Budget

Article XXIII

The budget of the Organization prepared by the Secretary-General shall be approved by the Council of Ministers. The budget shall be provided by contribution from Member States in accordance with the scale of assessment of the United Nations; provided, however, that no Member State shall be assessed an amount exceeding twenty percent of the yearly regular budget of the Organization. The Member States agree to pay their respective contributions regularly.

Signature and Ratification of Charter

Article XXIV

1. This Charter shall be open for signature to all independent sovereign African States and shall be ratified by the signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
2. The original instrument, done, if possible in African languages, in English and French, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Government of Ethiopia which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all independent sovereign African States.
3. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of Ethiopia, which shall notify all signatories of each such deposit.

Entry into Force

Article XXV

This Charter shall enter into force immediately upon receipt by the Government of Ethiopia of the instruments of ratification from two-thirds of the signatory States.

Registration of Charter

Article XXVI

This Charter shall, after due ratification, be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations through the Government of Ethiopia in conformity with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Interpretation of the Charter

Article XXVII

Any question which may arise concerning the interpretation of this Charter shall be decided by a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization.

Adhesion and Accession

Article XXVIII

1. Any independent sovereign African State may at any time notify the Secretary-General of its intention to adhere or accede to this Charter.
2. The Secretary-General shall, on receipt of such notification, communicate a copy of it to all the Member States. Admission shall be decided by a simple majority of the Member States. The decision of each Member State shall be transmitted to the Secretary-General, who shall, upon receipt of the required number of votes, communicate the decision to the State concerned.

Miscellaneous

Article XXIX

The working languages of the Organization and all its institutions shall be, if possible African languages, English and French, Arabic and Portuguese.

Article XXX

The Secretary-General may accept, on behalf of the Organization, gifts, bequests and other donations made to the Organization, provided that this is approved by the Council of Ministers.

Article XXXI

The Council of Ministers shall decide on the privileges and immunities to be accorded to the personnel of the Secretariat in the respective territories of the Member States.

Cessation of Membership

Article XXXI

Any State which desires to renounce its membership shall forward a written notification to the Secretary-General. At the end of one year from the date of such notification, if not withdrawn, the Charter shall cease to apply with respect to the renouncing State, which shall thereby cease to belong to the Organization.

Amendment of the Charter

Article XXXII

This Charter may be amended or revised if any Member State makes a written request to the Secretary-General to that effect; provided, however, that the proposed amendment is not submitted to the Assembly for consideration until all the Member States have been duly notified of it and a period of one year has elapsed. Such an amendment shall not be effective unless approved by at least two-thirds of all the Member States.


IN FAITH WHEREOF, We, the Heads of African States and Governments have signed this Charter.



Done in the City of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
25th day of May, 1963

                Source: http://www.oau-creation.com

By Makonnen Ketema

In May 1963, thirty-two independent African States, who had genuine hopes and visions for the continent of Africa, came together in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to create the Organization of African Unity (OAU). I had the privilege of hearing a detailed account of the staging of the 1963 Addis Ababa Summit Conference, and the reason as to why the Ethiopian capital became the site of the OAU headquarters, from a man who was once described by the international media as being closer than any other to the staging of the creation of the OAU. The man was none other than my father, the late Ketema Yifru, who was the Ethiopian Foreign Minister (1961-1971) at the time. Ketema Yifru was also recognized by the media as having played a prominent role in the creation of Africa's regional organization.

        Based on the discussions I had with my father as well as his taped and written interviews, I now clearly understand what he meant when he said, "Only a few are aware of the hard work and all the effort that brought about the creation of the OAU." Most of the public is not aware of the shuttle diplomacy, the closed door negotiations, and all the tireless effort, in general, that paved the way to creating the OAU. In addition, the majority of the public is not aware of the fierce diplomatic battle that was fought by a number of states to have the OAU headquartered in their respective capital cities.             

 

      Foreign Minister Ketema Yifru with Emperor Haile Selassie   

         After I spoke to many people and read through a number of books that have been written on this subject, it dawned on me that many are not privy to the details behind the formation of Africa's regional organization. It seems that other than a handful of people, the majority are not aware of the OAU's history and its formation. It is my hope that once this article reaches the public, it will give the readers an opportunity to understand the history behind the creation of the OAU. The article that you are about to read is solely based on the former Ethiopian Foreign Minister, the late Ketema Yifru's account on how the OAU was formed. The BBC's Focus on Africa Report describing Ketema Yifru's role in the creation of the OAU, stated that he was probably closer than any other to the staging of the 1963 Addis Ababa Summit Conference, which paved the way to the creation of the OAU.

        Ketema Yifru was promoted to the rank of Foreign Minister in 1961 - a period in which the rift between the Monrovia and Casablanca Groups seemed to have caused a permanent division in the continent. Ketema Yifru was an active participant in all the meetings and negotiations that led to the creation of the OAU. He also played a leading role in the August 1963 Dakar Foreign Ministers Conference, where the question regarding the location of the OAU's headquarters was once and for all resolved. This article will give the reader a bird's eye view of the events that led to the creation of the OAU. In addition, it will also put to rest the unfounded speculation of the reason as to why the Ethiopian capital was chosen to house the headquarters of Africa's regional organization. 

          Introduction     

    President Kwame Nkrumah

         In order to strengthen the continent of Africa and to make it less vulnerable to outside influence, President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana strongly believed that the continent should be united. Thus, in the late 1950s, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah started a movement, which stressed the immediate unity of the African continent. 

       When Dr. Kwame Nkrumah introduced the concept of African Unity to the continent, a division, which was based on the implementation of this new concept, was created at the onset. On one hand there were those countries which believed in the immediate unity of Africa. These countries were originally Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Later on Egypt, the Transitional Government of Algeria, and Morocco, joined the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union to form the Casablanca Group. On the other hand, the twenty-four member Monrovia Group, otherwise known as the Conservatives, which included Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Togo, and many others believed in a much more gradual approach to the question of African Unity. Many believed that the rift between the two groups would become permanent and thus ending the hopes and dreams of African Unity. 

      

      Presidents Modibo Kieta of Mali, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Seku Toure of Guinea (1960)

        Yet, in May 1963, these two opposing groups were able to come together to form the Organization of African Unity. Many had speculated as to how such opposing groups would merge to form the OAU. Some have suggested that all the independent states that came together in Addis Ababa, did so because of the great respect they had for Emperor Haile Selassie. Others have managed to feed the public, through various mediums, with similar unfounded stories as to how the OAU was formed. Even those who have genuine interest in telling the story have not been successful in their endeavors, because it is impossible to tell the story of the creation of the OAU with just a paragraph or two.

Ethiopia And The Two Opposing Groups

        The story begins in the early 1960s, when most of the independent African states had pledged an allegiance to either the Monrovia or the Casablanca Group. According to the then young Foreign Minister, Ato Ketema Yifru, his office received invitations from the two groups in January 1962.

          

      Ketema Yifru with President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya

        Ketema Yifru began his tenure as Foreign Minister (1961-1971) by concentrating his efforts to bring Ethiopia in line with mainstream Africa. His experience in the USA (early fifties) and most importantly the way in which his country was abandoned by the League of Nations, during its hour of need, had made Ketema Yifru an avowed Panafricanist. The Foreign Minister strongly believed that his country's true allies were his fellow African brothers and sisters. They say African freedom fighters, like Nkrumah, wept when they heard news of the 1935 invasion of Ethiopia, the country that was the beacon of hope for the rest of the continent. For Foreign Minister Ketema Yifru, the invitation from the two groups would ultimately bring his panafricanist agenda to the forefront. The Foreign Minister was now able to present his Panafricanist Foreign Policy to the Emperor.

                                    

                       Emperor Haile Selassie with Foreign Minister Ketema Yifru

                             Source: http://www.oau-creation.com

By Dr. Richard Pankhurst:-

We saw last week that post-World War II Ethiopia witnessed significant achievements in economic and other fields. This did not, however, prevent the growth, in the 1960s and early 1970s, of steadily increasing political discontent. Now read on:

The 1960 Coup d’Etat

Complaints at the slow pace of Ethiopian economic development, which was seen as comparing unfavourably with that of other African countries, and criticism of the Emperor’s autocratic rule, led to an escalation of political discontent in the late 1950s. During his absence on a state visit to Brazil, in December 1960, his Imperial Bodyguard staged a coup d’etat. Its mastermind was Garmam Neway, an American-educated radical and dedicated civil servant, whose brother, Mangestu, happened to be head of the bodyguard. The plotters arrested most of the Ministers, several of the Emperor’s closest confidants.

The coup received immediate support from University College students, who demonstrated in its favour. The population as a whole, however, failed to rally behind the insurrection, as Garmam and Mangestu had hoped. The coup was speedily crushed by the army and airforce. Before surrendering, however, the plotters killed most of their ministerial prisoners.

The Emperor, who, on hearing the news of the rebellion, had immediately decided to return, entered Addis Ababa in triumph. The coup’s student supporters on the other hand refused to accept defeat. In the months and years which followed they continued to agitate, and gradually succeeded in permanently politicising the country’s steadily expanding student body.

Eritrea

In Asmara, meanwhile, the Eritrean Assembly voted, under Ethiopian Government pressure, on 14 November 1962, for the territory’s complete union with Ethiopia. Eritrea, on the following day, was accordingly declared an integral part of Ethiopia. The legality of this act was, however, challenged by many Eritreans. Some of them shortly afterwards founded their territory’s first militant opposition organisation, the Eritrean Liberation Front, ELF.

“Land to the Tiller!”

Discontent in Ethiopia itself was by then markedly on the increase. Students, particularly after 1965, demonstrated against the government more or less regularly each year, with escalating determination. They focused on the need for land reform, with the cry, “Land to the Tiller!”, as well as on the treatment of the capital’s beggars, on the alleged corruption of senior officials, on the catastrophic famine of 1972-4 in Tegray and Wallo, which was comparable in intensity only to the Great Famine of the previous century, and on rising prices. Discontent also manifested itself in several small-scale peasant disturbances, mainly in the southern provinces, and in on-going agitation among the trade unions many of whose members thought that their official leadership was too subservient to the government.

Many people, even within the ruling elite, were moreover increasingly of opinion that the then Ethiopian mode of government was antiquated. Many were also concerned that the ageing Emperor was not apparently grooming his heir, the Crown Prince, to succeed him.

The Cabinet

Haile Sellassie, then in his eighties, was by this time increasingly concerned with foreign rather than internal affairs, and had relaxed his previous day-to-day scrutiny and control over the administration. The Government, as a whole, seems moreover to have been half-hearted in its recognition of the need for reform.

It was decided in 1960 that the Prime Minister, Aklilu Habtawald, instead of the Emperor, should chose the cabinet, but this limited constitutional reform failed to change either the composition or the spirit of the administration, and left the government’s critics unsatisfied.

A landlord-tenant reform bill was presented to Parliament in 1968, but met with such strong opposition in the landlord-dominated assembly that it had not been passed six years later when Revolution erupted.

Somalia

Despite the Emperor’s flair for personal diplomacy the country suffered, perhaps unavoidably, from strained relations with neighbouring Somalia. The latter country had come into existence in 1960, through a merger of the former Italian colony of Somalia (which had been for ten years under U.N.-sponsored Italian Trusteeship) and the former British Somaliland Protectorate.

The newly established Somalia state, inspired by the earlier British idea of a Greater Somalia, from its inception claimed the Ethiopian Ogaden, northern Kenya, and the southern half of the French Territory of the Afars and Issas, formerly the French Somaliland Protectorate. All three areas were inhabited by ethnic Somalis.

Tension between Ethiopia and Somalia peaked in 1964, when an undeclared war broke out, and an OAU cease-fire failed to put an end to continued periodical clashes.

Sudan

Ethiopian relations with neighbouring Sudan were also often tense. This was largely due to Ethiopian support for the Anya-Nya rebels in the southern Sudan, and Sudanese support for the Eritrean Liberation Front. Refugees from both sides were placed in camps near the common frontier, thus enabling them to pursue their political agitation and other activities unhampered.

 Source: http://www.linkethiopia.org

By Dr. Richard Pankhurst:-

We saw last week how Ethiopian foreign policy developed in the 1940s and 1950s. Now read on:

Political and Legal Reform, and Economic Developments

The 1950s and 1960s witnessed notable developments in the Ethiopian political, legal, and economic fields. Realisation of the inadequacy of the then existing Ethiopian Constitution, and comparison with the more progressive UN Eritrean Constitution of 1952, led to the formulation in 1955 of a Revised Ethiopian Constitution. Reportedly having taken six years to draft, it was a lengthy document, which outlined in detail the respective powers of the executive, i.e. the Emperor’s government, the legislature, and the judiciary. The legislature was for the first time to include a fully elected Chamber of Deputies, side by side with a Senate nominated by the Emperor. Provision was made for freedom of speech and of the press, in terms which were, however, to prove unenforceable.

Despite the Constitution’s liberal appearance the government remained essentially autocratic. Real power was retained by the Emperor, whose person was, as in the previous constitution, declared ‘sacred’. The Constitution’s enactment was followed, in 1957, by Ethiopia’s first General Election, carried out on the basis of full adult suffrage. Code Napoleon, or Code Haile Sellassie?

Steps were also taken, at about this time, for codification of the law, which the Emperor, thinking perhaps of the Code Napoleon, later claimed as the “supreme accomplishment” of his life. A Codification Commission was appointed in 1954, after which a Penal Code, the first of half a dozen modern codes drawn up with the help of Swiss and other foreign experts, was promulgated in 1957.

Five Year Plan, and Confederation of Labour Unions

A Five Year Plan, formulated by Yugoslav advisers, was inaugurated in the same year. A state-sponsored Confederation of Labour Unions, CELU, came into existence, in 1962.

Links with the Rest of Africa

The emergence meanwhile of a succession of independent African states, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, enabled the Ethiopian Government, speaking with an authority based on the country’s unique history of independence, to involve itself increasingly in the continent’s affairs.

Many anti-colonialist activists, among them Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya, both from Kenya, visited Ethiopia, and Mau Mau freedom-fighters, also from that country, were given refuge. The Emperor granted scholarships for students from parts of Africa under colonial rule to study in Ethiopia. Several dozen, from Kenya and elsewhere, attended the University which bore his name. Nelson Mandela, the future South African leader, received Ethiopian military training.

Ethiopian troops played a major role in the Congo (later Zaire) during the difficulties after that country’s independence in 1960. Ethiopian diplomats were active in bringing the radical and conservative African states together to found the Organisation of African Unity, OAU, in 1963.

The OAU and ECA

The Emperor used his prestige, as an older statesman, to arbitrate in several interAfrican disputes, including those between Algeria and Morocco in 1963, Nigeria and Biafra in 1968-9, and the Sudan government and southern Sudanese rebels in 1972. Ethiopia was likewise responsible, with Liberia, for taking South Africa to the International Court of Justice in an unsuccessful attempt to challenge the legality of the South African occupation of Namibia. Ethiopia in this and other ways acquired a unique status in twentieth century African politics.

All this led to Addis Ababa being chosen as the permanent headquarters of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, ECA, in 1958, and of the OAU in 1963.

Ties with the U.S.

Notwithstanding such interest in African affairs the country’s principal economic contacts were at this time with the United States. Ethiopia, in the 1950s and 1960s, was the largest recipient in Africa of American military and civilian aid.

Israel

Ethiopia also had particularly close relations with Israel, which supplied security and police training, and high-level University personnel. Relations with the Jewish state were, however, reluctantly broken off by the Emperor, in 1973, at the insistent behest of the OAU, which was at that time committed to a militantly anti-Zionist policy.

The years under review also witnessed the establishment of a number of important new institutions, many, but by no means all, in the capital. These included factories in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and Bahr Dar, an oil Refinery at Assab, and a sugar estate and factory at Wonji.

This period also saw the establishment, in Addis Ababa, of several new hotels, among them the Ghion, the Ethiopia, the Webe Shebelle, and the Hilton. The capital also successively acquired two new airports, the first on the Jimma Road, and the second at Bole. Other constructions in Addis Ababa in these years included a fine new Municipality building, the first skyscraper, or high-rise, buildings, and a new Palace, the Jubilee into which the Emperor moved, after handling over his older residence, the Geneta Le’ul, to the University.

Developments in the medical field were no less significant, and included the funding, in Addis Ababa, of the Duke of Harar Hospital, now the Black Lion (which critics at the time felt far too large to be ever fully occupied), and St Paul’s Hospital.

By the end of the period virtually all provincial capitals had been furnished with at least one secondary school and hospital. Haile Sellassie I , later Addis Ababa, University had Faculties in virtually all disciplines, and specialized branches in both Gondar and Alemaya.

 Source: http://www.linkethiopia.org

 

By Dr. Richard Pankhurst:-

We saw last week that Ethiopia, in the 1950s, edged ever closer to the United States. Now read on:

The Future of Eritrea

Emperor Haile Sellassie’s foreign policy, during the post-war years, was largely preoccupied with the future of the Italian colonies. This was a seemingly intractable question, which led to lengthy international discussions. The Ethiopian Government, for historical reasons, was particularly interested in the disposal of Eritrea. The colony, much of which prior to the late nineteenth century had formed part of Ethiopia, had been the base for two major invasions of the country, in 1895-6 and 1935-6. Acquisition of Eritrea likewise offered access to the sea, for which Ethiopian rulers had long hankered.

The future of Eritrea first came to the fore during the 1941 Ethiopian Liberation Campaign when the British had promised the colony’s inhabitants freedom from Italian rule. Later, in October 1944, British Foreign Secretary Eden had declared, in answer to a Parliamentary question by a Labour MP (drafted incidentally by my mother) that the Italian colonial empire in Africa was “irretrievably lost”. Italy in a Peace Treaty with the United Nations, signed in Paris on 10 February 1947, was accordingly made to surrender its colonies.

The disposal of these ex-colonies was to be the responsibility of the then four Great Powers, i.e. the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, and France. The treaty laid down, however, that, if they failed to agree within a year, the matter would be transferred to the United Nations General Assembly.

The Four Power and United Nations Commissions of Enquiry

The Four Powers, as it turned out, did not agree. They despatched a joint Commission of Enquiry to the ex-Italian colonies in 1947. It found the Eritrean population divided into three main factions: pro-Ethiopian Unionists, for the most part Christians, who demanded “reunion” with Ethiopia; adherents of a Muslim League, strongly opposed to such union; and members of a Pro-Italia party, many of them Italian pensioners, who advocated the restoration of Italian rule. The commissioners, whose findings reflected the political biases of their respective governments, produced divided conclusions and recommendations. The question of the colony’s future was then transferred to the United Nations, which, after inconclusive discussion, appointed a further commission of enquiry for Eritrea. Its members came from Burma, Guatemala, Norway, Pakistan, and South Africa.

Opinion in the ex-colony had by then crystallised into two factions: the Unionists on the one side, and an Independence block, formed by a coalition of the Muslim League and pro-Italia party, on the other. The new commissioners, like their predecessors, came forward with different proposals.Guatemala, representing the pro-Italian position, then held by the Latin American countries, and Pakistan, a strong protagonist of Islam, both favoured independence for the colony; Burma and South Africa, supported its federation with Ethiopia; and Norway, outright union.

Federation

The UN General Assembly influenced by the proposals of the three latter powers, finally decided, at the end of 1950, that Eritrea should be federated with Ethiopia, under the Ethiopian Crown. The Assembly further laid down that it would appoint a Commissioner for Eritrea, and that an Eritrean Assembly would be democratically elected by the people. The first task of the latter body was to approve an Eritrean Constitution, to be drafted by the UN Commissioner in consultation with the then British administration of the territory as well as the Ethiopian Government.

The Eritrean Assembly was duly elected, under UN auspices, and chose the Unionist leader, Tedla Bairu, as the territory’s Chief Executive. This seemed, to many observers, to give the Federation a stamp of popular approval. The Eritrean Constitution was likewise drafted, and approved, in 1952. The text of the constitution was, not surprisingly, considerably more democratic than Ethiopia’s old 1931 Constitution.

Relations with Italy

The Italian Peace Treaty of 1947, which explicitly applied to the period as from Mussolini’s invasion of the country, on 3 October 1935, also included articles of direct relevance to Ethiopia. Provision was thus made for Italy to return all loot taken from Ethiopia. Most of the loot was eventually returned. At least three gold crowns, which had been in Mussolini’s personal possession at Dongo at the time of his attempted escape to Switzerland, in April 1944, however, mysteriously disappeared, and were not returned.

Despite many Ethiopian attempts to secure its restoration a twenty-four metre high fourth century stone obelisk, looted from the ancient Ethiopian city of Aksum, and placed by Mussolini in front of the Ministry of Italian Africa building (later the UN Food and Agriculture building) was similarly not repatriated.

War Reparations

The treaty also provided for Italy to pay Ethiopia up to 25 million US dollars as war reparations. These were largely spent in the erection, in the next few years, of a hydro-electric plant at Koka, south-east of the capital, a cotton factory at Bahr Dar, by Lake Tana, and several small ships.

War Crimes

The treaty likewise provided for the trial of Italians guilty of war crimes in Ethiopia, and for the return of historic and other articles looted from the country. Attempts by the Ethiopian Government to prosecute Badoglio, Graziani and others whom it accused of having committed war crimes were, however, in one way or other frustrated.

Cordial, and Friendly Relations

Cordial diplomatic relations between the two countries were nonetheless eventually re-established in 1956. Despite much wrangling over the implementation of the Peace Treaty, particularly in the matter of loot, and memories of fascist atrocities, the Italians, by the mid-1950s, constituted perhaps Ethiopia’s most popular foreign community.

 Source: http://www.linkethiopia.org

 

By Dr. Richard Pankhurst:-

We saw last week that Ethiopia’s Post-World War II Relations with Britain were far from satisfactory, and the Emperor, in the mid 1940s. reduced his contacts with that country. Now read on:

Post-War Reconstruction

The 1940s and early 1950s constituted an important period of post-war reconstruction. Decrees designed for the most part to bring the entire country under centralised, and standardised, administration, were issued as early as 10 March 1942. Dealing with a wide variety of subjects, including significantly enough taxation, they were from that date published regularly, in the Negarit Gazeta, of official gazette. They bore the signature of the Minister of the Pen, or official writer of proclamations, which gave them the stamp of imperial authority.

President Roosevelt at Bitter Lake

Development, as the years went by, were based on steadily increasing American economic, military, and other assistance. Ethiopian ties with the United States were symbolised by a meeting between the Emperor and President Roosevelt, held by the Suez Canal Bitter Lake at the beginning of 1945. The British Minister in Addis Ababa, Robert Howe, hearing the Emperor’s Egypt-bound aeroplane flying over his legation, before day-light, at once investigated the cause of the unusual noise. Ascertaining what this was, and perhaps fearing an Ethiopian opening to the United States, he commissioned a small ‘plane to pursue the monarch to Egypt.

The State Bank of Ethiopia, Ethiopian Airlines, and American Silver

Post-war Ethiopian contacts with the United States had in fact started three years earlier. A new government bank, the State Bank of Ethiopia, established in 1942, was run at first by an American governor, George Blowers. A new national currency, inaugurated in 1945, owed its successful introduction to the United States. The latter provided the silver needed to mint 50 cent coins, whose intrinsic value ensured popular acceptance of the new paper money. The country’s first national air services, Ethiopian Airlines, at first almost entirely American manned, was set up in close collaboration with the American carrier Trans World Airlines, in 1946.

The Imperial Highway Authority

American financial assistance made possible the establishment of an Imperial Highway Authority, IHA. Funded with assistance from the American-sponsored International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, IBRD, it restored old and built many new roads.

An Important Landmark

An important landmark in Ethio-American relations was the signing by the two countries, on 22 May 1953, of a 25-year Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations. This provided inter alia for an American communications base, the Kagnew base as it was called, just outside Asmara, which was by then under Ethiopian rule. Training of Ethiopian soldiers, by a British Military Mission to Ethiopia, BMME, withdrawn in 1951, was carried out, after 1953, by an American Military Assistance Advisory Group, MAAG. American staff, including deans, were prominent in the country’s institution of higher learning, Haile Sellassie I University, in educational development and planning, through the United States Point Four Program, and in secondary school teaching, through the US Peace Corps. The majority of Ethiopian students studying abroad, including many members of the military, went to the United States, and Ethiopian soldiers fought, under American command, in the Korean War, of 1950-3.

Continuing, though perhaps less consistently than in Menilek’s day, Ethiopia’s old policy of avoiding dependence on any one foreign power, Haile Sellassie’s government also made use of foreign assistance, and expertise, from other lands. The Air Force, the Imperial Bodyguard, telecommunications, and schoolbuilding, were thus entrusted to Swedes, the police to Germans and Israelis, planning to Yugoslavs, and the country’s principal Military Academy, at Harar, to Indians. Teachers from the sub-continent were also extensively employed, particularly in the provinces.

Educational Developments

This period witnessed many promising developments in the educational sector. These included the re-opening of pre-war schools, and the establishment of many new ones. The most prestigious schools in the capital were the Haile Sellassie I Secondary School, founded in 1943, and the General Orde Wingate Secondary School, in 1946. Useful teaching was also given at vocational schools, for commerce, handicrafts, and technology Education, contrary to the situation prior to the war, was now extremely popular. Almost every school had a waiting list for new student intake. The Emperor, when driving in his car, was frequently mobbed by children crying, “School! school!”. Increasing numbers of students were sent for study abroad, mainly to English speaking countries: first to Britain, and later to the United States, Canada, and India. The growth of secondary education made possible the establishment, in 1950, of the country’s first institution of higher learning, the University College of Addis Ababa. This educational establishment was later merged with other colleges, specialising in agriculture, building, commerce, engineering, public health, technology, and theology, to form the nucleus of Haile Sellassie I University, established in 1961 (later renamed Addis Ababa University). It subsequently also comprised colleges of business administration, education, law, and medicine, a school of social work, and Institutes of Ethiopian Studies, Patho-Biology, and Development Research. The University’s administraion, and some of the faculties, were housed in the former Imperial Palace, and its well-kept grounds, which the Emperor donated for the purpose.

Two New Hospitals

A number of new hospitals were also established. The most prestigious was the country’s first modern teaching hospital, named after the Emperor’s daughter, Princess Tsahay, who had served as a nurse in Britain in 1940, during the London Blitz. This institution, founded in 1951, was funded by international subscription, mainly in Britain. A Russian Red Cross hospital was also set up, named after Dajazmach Balcha, who had fought at Adwa, and later in the patriotic resistance to the fascist occupation.

  Source: http://www.linkethiopia.org

By Dr. Richard Pankhurst:-

We saw last week that Ethiopia’s liberation from Italian fascist rule, by British forces, resulted in no small Ethio-British tension. Now read on:

Haile Sellassie Unwilling to Accept British Hegemony

Haile Sellassie, 1n 1941, was unwilling to acquiesce in British hegemony, or to accept the British political agenda. He succeeded in despatching a telegram to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in London, inquiring why a treaty between Ethiopia and Britain had been so long delayed. The British Premier replied, by way of excuse, that this had been due to a desire to ensure that nothing remained in the draft agreement “which could be interpreted as interfering with your sovereign rights or with the independence of Ethiopia”. The Emperor, determined to spur the British to action, promptly had this reply broadcast on Addis Ababa radio. The Government in London, feeling that further delays were impermissible, thereupon summoned Sir Philip to England, where Churchill and Eden pressed him to come to a speedy agreement with the Emperor.

The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1942

After much bargaining an Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and Military Convention were duly signed, on 31 January 1942. The treaty recognised Ethiopia as an independent state, and laid down that the Emperor was free to form a government. Britain’s paramount position was, however, officially recognised, and many restrictions were imposed on Ethiopian sovereignty. The agreement thus specified that the British representative was to be ex-officio doyen of the diplomatic corps, followed in precedence by the British Commander-in-Chief, East Africa, or his representative. The Emperor was obliged to appoint British advisers, a British Commissioner of Police, and British police officers, inspectors, judges, and magistrates. No other foreign adviser could be appointed without consultation with the British. The latter were to be responsible for policing Addis Ababa, and had the right to station their military wherever they deemed necessary.

The Military Convention went further. It permitted the British to assert military control over Addis Ababa and the country’s principal towns, and to move their armed forces, and military aircraft, into, out of, and around the country at will. The British military were exempt from the jurisdiction of Ethiopian courts, and could use former Italian state property without payment. The Emperor was obliged to requisition and hand over to the British military authorities whatever private property they might require. The radio station, the telephone system, and the railway were to remain under British control. The Ethiopian army was to be trained by a British military mission, and all prisoners-of-war were to be handed over to the British military, who were also to have sole jurisdiction over the repatriation of Italian civilians. The British were, finally, allowed to remain in control of Ogaden, the Somali-inhabited area adjacent to Italian Somalia, which occupied almost a third of the entire country, the Reserved Area, a smaller strip of land adjacent to British Somaliland, and the entire stretch of territory occupied by the Addis Ababa-Jibuti railway.

In return for these considerable concessions the British agreed to provide the Emperor with an annual subsidy, amounting to a million and a half pounds Sterling for the first year, a million for the second, half a million for the third, and a quarter of a million for a fourth, if the Agreement was still in force at that time.

The Emperor and Ministers Deeply Concerned

The Emperor and his Ministers were deeply concerned, not only at the restrictions on Ethiopian sovereignty, but also at the economic consequences thereof. The country was at that time exporting more than it imported, and was thus contributing more to the Sterling area than it received therefrom. The British were thus profiting from Ethiopian exports, and appropriating resources which could otherwise have been used on Ethiopian development. Notwithstanding this manifestly unfair situation the Ethiopian Government was for several years reluctant to press the British for any revision of the agreement. This was largely, according to their American foreign affairs adviser, John Spencer, because they were afraid that the British might retaliate by reoccupying parts of the country. This, in the aftermath of the war, could well have led to the government’s political de-stabilisation.

Despite such fears the Ethiopian Government eventually decided, on 25 May 1944, to demand a new agreement. Receiving no reply from the British by 16 August it threatened to re-occupy Ogaden and the Reserved Area. The British, towards the end of September, accordingly despatched an envoy, Lord de la Warr, to Addis Ababa. In the ensuing talks he stubbornly insisted on the British retention of Ogaden and the Reserved Area. Tough negotiations followed. At one point he threatened to break off the talks, and at another warned that the British, if balked in their objectives, would reoccupy the entire country. A treaty was, however, eventually signed, on 19 December 1944.

The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1944

In this second Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty the Ethiopians had little option but to agree to British demands for the continued occupation of the Reserved Area and Ogaden. The Emperor’s negotiators nevertheless persuaded the British to accept a reformulation of the relevant article, Article 7, which accordingly declared:

“In order as an Ally to contribute to the effective prosecution of the war, and without prejudice to her underlying sovereignty, the Imperial Ethiopian Government hereby agree that, for the duration of the Agreement, the territories designated as the Reserved Area and the Ogaden… shall be under British Military Administration’”.

This formula, from the Ethiopian point of view, was more cleverly devised than the British negotiators perhaps realised. The use of the word “ally” implied that the country could no longer be treated as “occupied enemy territory”, that it was entitled to a seat in any future Peace Conference, and that the British occupation of the two territories was only temporary, to no more than the duration of the war. The reference to Ethiopia’s “underlying sovereignty” was also significant. It enabled the Ethiopian Government immediately to re-assert its sovereignty by granting an American concern, the Sinclair Company, an oil concession over the area. In the rest of the treaty the British waived their earlier insistence of diplomatic precedence, abandoned their extra-territorial military privileges, and relinquished their control over the Addis Ababa-Djibuti railway, and their monopoly over aviation. The treaty thus marked the full resumption of Ethiopian independence. It was, however, symbolic of the Emperor’s displeasure that he did not sign the agreement, but relegated this onerous task to his Prime Minister, Endalkachew Makonnen. Haile Sellassie also, significantly, rejected any further subsidy from Britain.

Britain’s motive in retaining Ogaden became apparent in the Spring of 1946, when the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, proposed that the territory be joined to ex-Italian Somalia, and placed, together with British Somaliland, under British Trusteeship. His government further suggested that Ethiopia, bereft of Ogaden, should be given compensation in Eritrea. This Greater Somalia plan, as it was called, was immediately rejected by the Ethiopian Government, and ran into strong Soviet opposition. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov declared that the scheme was designed to “expand the British Empire at the expense of Italy and Ethiopia, and to consolidate the monopolistic position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea”.

Faced with such fierce opposition, Britain abandoned its hold on most of Ogaden in 1948, but retained the fertile grazing land of Haud until 1954, when the entire region was at last, returned to Ethiopia. This was a full two decades after its first alienation by fascist Italy at the time of Wal Wal.

 Source: http://www.linkethiopia.org

 

By Dr. Richard Pankhurst:-

We saw last week how Mussolini’s entry into the European war, on 10 June 1941, led directly to Ethiopia’s Liberation, and to the country’s occupation by British troops. Now read on:

The Italian Legacy

The collapse of fascist rule, the termination of Italian investment, upon which the Italian East African empire had hitherto been based, the demobilisation of colonial soldiers, many still in possession of their weapons, the disruption of the economy, the consequent drying-up of trade, and hence of government revenue, created major problems for newly liberated Ethiopia, in 1941.

Neither the Emperor, whose pre-war administration had been disbanded five years earlier, nor the British, who lacked any experience of the country, were well equipped to run an efficient post-liberation state. Ethiopian administration was

further handicapped by the fact that a significant section of the educated class had died, in some cases been massacred, during the occupation, and because education of “natives” during that period occupation had largely ceased.

Post-Liberation Problems

Post-liberation problems were compounded by the Ethiopian Government’s virtual inability to raise taxes, as well as by the presence in the country of 40,000 Italian civilians. The latter were enemy nationals, and hence a security risk, but were expected, in accordance with then contemporary racial values, to be provided, as Europeans, with food, and medical facilities, at the level to which they were accustomed.

Returnees, Collaborators, and Patriots

The politics of the immediate post-liberation era were further complicated by the widespread diffusion of Italian arms, many in the possession of former colonial troops, and by the fragmentation of the Ethiopian elite into three different groups: the Returnees, who had been in exile with the Emperor, and were therefore to some extent out of touch with the situation in Ethiopia; the Collaborators, who had worked with the invaders, and were therefore better informed, but held in disrepute in patriotic circles; and the Patriots, who had played a major role in the liberation, but were in many cases unfamiliar with modern administration. All three groups expected, and to some extent received, posts in government service, as a reward for past services, or in recognition of their influence, or loyalty to the monarch.

Tensions between the Centre and the Provinces

Tensions between the central government and the provinces had to some extent been acerbated by fascist policy, which had tried to divide the “native” population on both ethnic and religious lines. This disintegrative tendency had, however, been largely counter-balanced by other developments of the occupation period. These included the improvement of roads, and the installation of a public radio address system in the principal towns, as well as an awakened sense of Ethiopian patriotism. The political power of the centre was likewise much strengthened by the triumphant return of the Emperor, and by the visible support he received from the British, who in the immediate post-war period enjoyed a virtual monopoly of military power. Like previous rulers he also exercised many forms of patronage, not only, as in the past, in respect of land and political appointment, but now also in the allocation of school places, and scholarships abroad.

A not-insignificant rebellion was, however, soon to flare in Tegray.

Ethio-British Relations

The Emperor, after his return to Ethiopia, was largely preoccupied with relations with the British. The latter, who had entered the country as liberators, had in fact replaced the Italians as an occupying power. Relations between the Ethiopians and the British were from the outset ambiguous. British policy towards Ethiopia was first enunciated, in general terms, by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who told the British House of Commons, on 4 February 1941, that his government “would welcome the re-appearance of an independent Ethiopian State and recognise the claim of Emperor Haile Sellassie to the throne”. Official British policy was further clarified in high-level talks, held shortly afterwards in February and March. These were based, in accordance with Eden’s statement, on the “rejection of any idea of a protectorate”, or of “the provision of a strong western administration of the country”.

Differing Views on Ethiopia’s Future

After the Emperor’s return to Addis Ababa, in May, there was, however, considerable tension between the Ethiopians and the British. The two parties differed greatly in their views on the country’s future government. The Ethiopians expected to assume full sovereignty without delay, whereas the British considered the country’s independence only as a long distance objective. A first clash on this question occurred as early as 11 May 1941, when the Emperor appointed his first post-war cabinet. The British representative, Brigadier Maurice Lush, sternly informed him that such appointments could not be made “until a peace treaty has been effected with Italy” Haile Sellassie was, not surprisingly, indignant. A compromise was, however, duly effected, whereby the British accepted the appointment of the ministers, but “chose to regard them as merely advisers” to the British military administration of the country.

It was symptomatic that the Emperor’s private mail was for a time subject to British censorship, and opened by British censors. His Imperial Majesty, we are informed, was not amused.

“Liberators” or “Looters”?

Tension was further increased by the decision of the British military authorities to appropriate, and take out of the country, some of the principal factories earlier installed by the Italians, as well as weapons, and military and other transport. Ethiopia was thus very visibly impoverished by its liberators, who soon came to be popularly regarded as its looters. Friction was also created by the presence, in the Ethiopian capital, of white South African troops, who attempted to perpetuate the strict colour bar earlier instituted by the Italians.

British opinion in relation to Ethiopia’s independence varied greatly. Sir Philip Mitchell, the chief British Political Officer in the Middle East, sought to impose particularly strong control over Ethiopia, but others in London took the view that Great Britain should demonstrate to the world that it could liberate a country without imposing political strings. Sir Philip, because of his official position, was nevertheless able to press the Emperor to abide by British “advice” in “all important matters, internal and external, touching the government of the country”; to levy taxes and allocate expenditure only with “prior approval” of the British Government; to grant British courts jurisdiction over foreigners; “to raise no objection” if the British Commander-in-Chief “found it necessary to resume military control over any part of Ethiopia”; and not to raise armed forces, or undertake military operations, “except as agreed by His Majesty’s Government’s representative”. Taxation, expenditure, communications, and the jurisdiction of foreigners were to be under British control. In return for this extensive control he proposed that the Emperor be offered a subsidy, British advisers, and the opportunity of discussing proposals for a treaty. British Economic Controls

Ethiopia, as a result of its liberation by the British troops, was at this time firmly under British economic as well as political control. The country was incorporated into the British-based Sterling Area, used British East African Shillings, was dependent on a British bank, Barclay’s, and was served exclusively by the British Overseas Aviation Corporation, B.O.A.C. Virtually all political power was likewise in the hands of the British military, who went so far as to censor the Emperor’s private correspondence. The local British officials were so bent on perpetuating that paramountcy that an American Government memorandum of June 1941 bluntly asserted that Britain was seeking to “establish a protectorate over Abyssinia”.

Proposed Partition of the Country

Some British officials at this period, and for the next few years, moreover sought to partition the country. In the north there were plans to unite parts of Tegray with the adjacent highlands of Eritrea, to form a new state under British protection. In the south-east the British Government proposed incorporating the already British-occupied Ogaden with British-occupied Somalia, to create a Greater Somalia, under British trusteeship. British official thinking also for a time envisaged the partition of Eritrea, with the western portion annexed to the then Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

For all the above reasons, the fund of Ethiopian good-will towards Britain, the Country’s Liberator, was steadily dissipated, giving way to fear, suspicion, mistrust, and even anger.

 Source: http://www.linkethiopia.org

 

By Dr. Richard Pankhurst:-

At the outbreak of the European war, on 3 September 1939, Mussolini refrained from involving himself in the war. He nevertheless declared that fascist Italy, a close ally of nazi Germany, was in a state of “pre-belligerency”. By that he implied that he was committed to eventually participating in the struggle. By postponing his entry into the conflict he obviated having to fight with Italy’s neighbour, France, and avoided any immediate Allied attack on the insecure Italian East African empire, where the Ethiopian patriots were still unbeaten. After Hitler’s victory over France in the early summer of 1940, however, the Duce anticipated that Germany would rapidly win the war. Anxious to be participate in an ensuing peace conference he declared war on Britain and France, on 10 June.

Historical Background

Italy’s entry into the European war, for which the Ethiopian patriots had long

been waiting, had important, and almost immediate consequences, making it a turning point in Ethiopian history. Britain, as a result, of Mussolini’s action, found itself obliged to modify, if not entirely to abandon, its long-established, pro-colonial, attitude to Italo-Ethiopian relations. The British Government, it will be recalled, had for half a century favoured Italian expansion in Ethiopia. Britain had supported Italy’s occupation of Massawa in 1885, and had thereafter consistently sought to accommodate Italian colonial ambitions: by dispatching the Portal mission to help the Italians after Ras Alula’s victory at Dogali in 1887, by recognising Italy’s Protectorate claim in 1890, by signing the Tripartite Treaty of 1906, by offering Italy a revision of colonial frontiers in 1915, and by participating in the AngloItalian demarche of 1925 against which Tafari Makonnen had protested to the League. Britain’s policy of accommodation had continued into the immediate pre-war period, with the restriction of arms sales immediately prior to the fascist invasion, the limitation of sanctions against Italy and the Hoare-Laval plan of 1935, and, finally, the recognition of the Italian “conquest” in 1938.

Opening of the Liberation Campaign

The opening of hostilities in the summer of 1940 necessarily changed the British perspective. The Italians in East Africa threatened Britain’s important sea route to India, and were in a position to overrun three British or British-run territories: Kenya, British Somaliland, and Sudan. The Italians in Libya to the north and in East Africa to the south seemed furthermore poised to occupy Egypt and Sudan, in a pincer operation. This, if successful, would have severed what a contemporary official British publication aptly described as “the wasp-waist of the British Empire”. The Italians in East Africa, almost entirely cut off from metropolitan Italy, and gravely weakened by the activities of the patriots, were, however, in no position to exploit the situation in their favour.

British Help for the Patriots

The first, and easiest, British response to Italy’s entry into the European war was to offer assistance to the Ethiopian patriots on the borders of Sudan. The British District Officer at Gedaref, on the Sudanese side of the frontier, immediately dispatched twelve already prepared Amharic letters, written in the name of the British commander in Sudan, General Sir William Platt, to patriot chiefs of Gojjam, Armachaho, Walqayt, and Bagemder. These promised the patriots assistance in “destroying the common enemy”. On 23 June 1940, Emperor Haile Sellassie was flown from England, and shortly afterwards proclaimed, on 2 July that Great Britain would grant Ethiopia “the aid of her incomparable might”. The promised assistance was, however, far less than the patriots expected. Haile Sellassie, in his Autobiography, complained bitterly at its inadequacy, as well as its tardy arrival.

The Emperor’s Arrival in Sudan: Wooing the Patriots

Despite such criticism British help proved of decisive importance. News of it, and of the Emperor’s arrival in Sudan, had an electrifying effect. Hundreds of Ethiopians trekked across the frontier into Sudan, while many Italian colonial troops deserted.

Sandford and Wingate

The British in the months which followed continued to woo the patriots. On 12 August, a British officer, Colonel Daniel Sandford, entered Gojjam, as head of a small Ethio-British mission, Mission 101, to make contact with the patriots, and to encourage them to join together in a common struggle. Several leaders, then torn by rivalry, shortly afterwards agreed to sign a unity pact. On 20 November a more senior British officer, Major-General Orde Wingate, arrived in Gojjam by ‘plane, with promises of speedy, though limited, aid. The patriots, thrilled by his coming, spoke of it as a “sign from the skies”. A dynamic, if at times controversial, leader skilled in guerrilla warfare, he had earlier said to General Archibald Wavell, his superior in Cairo: “Give me a small fighting force of first-class men, and from the core of Ethiopia I will eat into the Italian apple and turn it so rotten that it will drop into our hands”.

Three Almost Simultaneous Attacks

Anglo-Ethiopian cooperation bore fruit in the second half of January 1941 when the British launched three major, almost simultaneous, attacks on Italian East Africa. The first began on 19 January, when British and Indian troops under General William Platt crossed the frontier at Kassala into Eritrea. They thus began an attack which took them, with unexpected speed, via Karan, site of a fierce battle, through Eritrea into northern Tegray. The second attack, almost five hundred kilometres to the south, opened on the following day, when a much smaller force of Ethiopians, Sudanese and Britons, led by the Emperor, with Wingate and Sandford, raised the Ethiopian flag at the Ethiopian border village of Um Idla. Making contact with the patriots of Gojjam they began an advance to the Blue Nile on the road to Addis Ababa. The third attack, a thousand five hundred miles further south, started four days later, on 24 January, when British and South African soldiers, under the command of General Alan Cunningham, crossed from Kenya into Italian Somalia. They thus began an immense trek via Mogadishu and Harar to Addis Ababa, which they occupied, on 6 April. The advance to the Ethiopian capital, which had taken De Bono and Badoglio seven months in 1935-6, was thus accomplished by the Allies, with patriot help, in little more than three.

The Victories of the Patriots

The Ethiopian patriots played a major, if at the time perhaps not always sufficiently recognised, role in the Liberation campaign. Throughout their previous four year struggle they had done much to isolate, tie down, and eventually weary, the enemy. On eventually receiving British military assistance, they took the offensive and, when provided with British aerial support, swept across Gojjam to play a significant role in the capture of Burye. The advance of the Emperor’s patriot army was so rapid that the British high command began to fear that Ethiopian forces might reach Addis Ababa before their British – and South African – allies, and thus endanger the safety of the city’s Italian, i.e. fellow European, population. Royal Air Force support for the Patriots was for that reason no longer forthcoming

Ras Ababa Aragay

In Shawa meanwhile, the patriot leader Ras Ababa Aragay, who had fought virtually throughout the entire occupation, now strengthened his position. Addis Ababa, though guarded by Italian garrison troops protected by pill-boxes and barbed wire entanglements, was virtually surrounded by his and other patriot units. The Italians, terrified that the patriots would break into the capital, were seriously demoralised. Rather than fall into the hands of their Ethiopian enemies they hastened, on 4 April, to surrender to the South Africans, who entered the capital two days later. Central Italian resistance thus came ended. Mussolini’s once triumphant army was reduced to a number of isolated, and beleaguered garrisons.

The Emperor, with the patriots, finally entered Addis Ababa, on 5 May 1941, exactly five years after Badogio’s capture of the city in 1936. Patriot forces subsequently played an important role in finally “mopping up” operations throughout Ethiopia, from April to November 1941. They were prominent in the capture of many towns, among them Dase, Jemma, Gore, Dabra Tabor, and Laqamti. The patriots also took part in scaling the heights of Amba Alagi, where the Duke of Aosta surrendered, on 16 May. A South African soldier, recalling this operation, observed: “When we, the mighty white conquerors, fell down exhausted, after climbing a few hundred feet”, the patriots “stared at us in amazement; that we were unable to walk unburdened while they ran with loads never failed to astonish them”. The last battle of the war was fought, one more with considerable patriot help, at Gondar, which succumbed to the Allies, on 27 November 1941.

 Source: http://www.linkethiopia.org